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Juergen B. Donges
THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF SPAIN WITH THE E.E.C.
- Problems and Prospects -
Introduction
In 1959/60, there was a radical shift in Spain's economic development
strategy from a strongly autarchic to a cautiously outward orientation.
A group of neo-liberal technocrats who enterered for the first time
since Civil War the governmental administration obviously understood
that the establishment of the European Common Market (1957) and the
introduction of external convertibility by the highly industrialized
countries (1958) would accentuate the economic growth path in Western
Europe and, thereby, open new possibilities of rapid economic develop-
ment for Spain. After all, the Government recognized that economic
integration is an important device for promoting economic development.
This is particularly true if industrialization is considered as a
corner-stone of rapid economic and social progress (as was, and is, the
case in Spain). The arguments in favour of more integration are too
well known to need a detailed elaboration here. Essentially, they
refer to the economies of scale that can be achieved in a wider market
than the relatively small national one, to the increase of overall
efficiency that will result from the more competitive environment,
and to the improvement in the allocation of resources that can take
place by arriving at a product-mix according to the country's compara-
tive advantage. Whatever the degree to which Spain was able to reap
the benefits of integration, the economic boom, which the country has
been experiencing since 1960, and which deserves to be regarded as an
Remark: This paper has been prepared for the Conference on "E.E.C. and
the Mediterranean Countries" held at the University of Reading in
December 14-16, 1973.- 2 -
outstanding success story in terms of income expansion as well as
of growth and structural changes of production and foreign trade
proves that the opening of the economy was rewarding thus far.
2. As the Government had great faith in the positive effects of future
trade expansion between Spain and the Western European countries, it
tried to attain some kind of economic association with the European
Economic Community - in spite of the resistance of (also politically
motivated) vested interests. In March 1970, eight years after the
first official application was made, Spain signed a bilateral pre-
ferential trade agreement (PTA) with the E.E.C. By this Agreement,
which became effective in October 1970 and covers an initial period
of six years, the E.E.C. is committed to grant concessions on Spain's
agricultural exports and to provide tariff reductions on Spanish
manufactured exports; in return, Spain has to liberalize global
quotas formerly applied to agricultural imports from the Common Market
and she has to gradually reduce customs tariffs on manufactured im-
ports from the Community. Iron and steel products have been expressively
excluded from the Agreement, since they are covered by the former
E.C.S.C. For all those who had wanted Spain to become an associate
member of the E.E.C, the PTA is far from being a satisfactory arrange-
ment. Whether or not the PTA paves the way for arriving at some sort
of formal Spanish membership in the E.E.C. after 1977 is, however,
still a matter of conjecture. While most of Spain's leading policy-
makers and academic economists think that such an integration is
desirable, there are strong objections in E.E.C. member countries which
are governed by well-known political considerations. Whatever the out-
come, it seems to be certain that for economic reasons both Spain and
the E.E.C. ought to be prepared to consolidate and extend their
mutual trade relations.
For details see J.B. Donges, "From an Autarchic towards a Cautiously
Outward-Looking Industrialization Policy: The Case of Spain", Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 107, No. 1, 1971, p. 48 et seqs.- 3 -
3. Taking a closer economic relationship as desirable, it appears
worthwhile to analyze the Preferential Trade Agreement with a view
of detecting threads and promises of the Common Market for the
Spanish economy. The major questions to be discussed in this context
refer to the relative importance of the Common Market for the Spanish
economy, to the pro's and con's of this Agreement in the light of both
the recent accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to
the E.E.C. and the Community's trade policy towards developing
countries, and to the kind of adaptation of Spain's manufacturing
sector which is necessary to meet the increasing competition from
abroad. The present paper is aimed at critically examining these
questions as succinctly as possible. To begin with, some background
data on the trade relationship between Spain and the Community are
presented.
Summary Survey of Spain's Trade with the E.E.C.
4. The E.E.C. is one of the most important markets for Spain's exports
and one of the main sources of supply of importable products (Table 1).
(a) In 1971, the original Six bought 37.1 percent, and the actual Nine
46.7 percent, of Spain's exports, while their share in Spain's
total imports amounted to 32.9 and 41.6 percent, respectively.
For some commodity groups these shares are significantly higher,
particularly when the enlarged E.E.C. is considered. Examples on
the side of Spain's exports are animal and vegetable oils, non-
oil related crude materials and foodstuffs. As to imports from
the E.E.C, the significance of this area is particularly evident
in the case of machinery, transport equipment, basic manufactures
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'According to 1-digit SITC. Sub-totals do not necessarily add to the totals because of non-specified trade in commodities.
Source! Calculated from United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues.(b) The expansion of total trade between Spain and the E.E.C. during
the last decade has been remarkable in absolute and percentage
terms (when compared with the experience of other semi-indus-
trialized countries), but not more rapid than Spain's total
trade. This phenomenon reflects the fact that the country in
its attempt to diversify the foreign trade structure, did not
rely exclusively on the potentialities of the Common Market but
also enlarged trade with other areas of the world, particularly
the U.S. and Latin America.
(c) Among the E.E.C. member countries, West Germany was the most
important purchasing market for Spain's export products. In 1971,
she bought goods worth about $ 358 million which represents
32.8 (26.1) percent of Spain's total exports to the Community.
West Germany is followed, in decreasing order of importance, by
France with 29.2 (23.2) percent, United Kingdom 18.1 (18.1),
Italy 18.3 (14.6), Netherlands 13.3 (10.6), Belgium-Luxemburg
6.4 (5.1), Denmark 1.6 (1.6), and Ireland 0.6 (0.6). From the
perspective of the E.E.C. countries, Spain appears, however, as
only a marginal supplier in the Common Market: she contributed
1.2 (1.5) percent to that Market's total imports. As far as
Spain's imports from the E.E.C. are concerned, 37.1 (29.4) per-
cent came from West Germany in 1971; the other countries followed
in the same order as above as sources of supply. Again, Spain's
importance as a market for the E.E.C. countries' exports is
modest; only 1.7 percent went to Spain in 1971.
5. An analysis of the composition of Spain's exports to and imports from
the E.E.C. reveal the following features:
Bracketed figures refer to the enlarged European Economic
Communi ty.*• 6 —
(a) The import structure shows a significant dependence on capital
goods. About 43 (41) percent of Spain's total imports from the
Community was accounted for by this major product category in
1971; important items were industrial machines, engines, electrical
power machinery, office machines, and road motor vehicle parts.
Basic manufactures (such as textile yarn and thread, glassware,
and non-ferrous metals, apart from iron and steel) and chemicals
(such as organic elements, plastic materials, and pharmaceutical
products), amounting to approximately 19 (19) and 17 (16) percent,
respectively, constituted the next largest commodity groups. This
is in line with what one would expect, given the difference between
Spain and the E.E.C. with respect to stage of development, capital-
labour proportions and natural resource endowments.
(b) The same holds true for Spain's export structure. Almost one-third
of the total value of Spanish exports to the Common Market con-
sisted of foodstuffs (particularly of fish products, oranges and
fresh vegetables) in the reference year. Basic manufactures and
capital goods also play a noticeable role in Spain's export trade
with the E.E.C: they accounted for about 20 (19) percent and 19
(18) percent of total export value, respectively. The similarities
between export and import structure illustrate the importance of
intra-industry (rather than inter-industry) specialization in the
trade with the E.E.C. Moreover, it should be noted that the broad
groups of capital goods include mainly metalworking machinery,
passenger cars, and ships, i.e. product-cycle goods in the Vernon-
Hirsch-sense, where Spain could become comparatively efficient
after catching-up with the (foreign) production technique embodied.
6. When trying to assess whether or not the expansion of trade with the E.E.C.
is beneficial to Spain, one can hear arguments in some Spanish quarters
that it is not. Those who adhere to this view can cite the evidence that the- 7 -
value of Spain's exports to the Common Market was in 1971 higher
than the imports from the E.E.C. in only 18 (19) out of 45 items.
Outstanding instances are fruit and vegetables with an export surplus
of t 223.5 million {$ 307.8 million) and olive oil with $ 107.2
million {$ 108.9 million). However, it lies in the nature of still
being a semi-industrialized country, as Spain is, that there are
trade deficits with the far more developed E.E.C. Provided that Spain
does not pay higher prices for goods imported from the Common Market
than for those available elsewhere, trade deficits can be considered
to be a good indicator of benefits (rather than disadvantages)
accruing to the country from its trade relations with the E.E.C. ;
they reflect certainly the extent to which the Community transfers
resources to Spain at world prices and to which a rational division
of labour is enhanced. That is to say, that all the talks about sign
and even size of bilateral trade balances is rather misplaced.
Nature of the Agreement
The extent to which the Agreement will intensify trade relations be-
tween Spain and the Community, depends clearly on the degree of effec-
tive reductions in tariff and non-tariff protection. In principle, all
tradable goods (with the exception of iron and steel products) were
regarded as being eligible for liberalization through the Agreement.
An examination of the scheme shows, however, that there are important
differences in the concessions agreed upon, presumably because of
conflicts of interest between the parties.
8. As can be seen from Table 2, Spain's concessions consist of gradual
reductions in import protection affecting 71 percent of the country's
imports from the E.E.C. in the base year, 1968. The coverage of the
E.E.C. concessions is less extensive. In addition, the Community has
excluded many products of export interest to Spain because of her- 8 -
Table 2 - The Profile of Concessions
Spain European Economic Community
Product coverage for tariff reductions
Total imports from E.'E.C. $ 1,200m.
-Imports of E.C.S.C. products t 88m.
-Duty-free under MFN tariffs and free-port
regulations % 185m.
-Products excluded % 52m.
Product coverage (73 p.c. of tot



























































Average tariff cut by January 1977: 22.9 p.c.
(25.0 p.c.)
Liberalization of Import Quotas
(a) Only applicable to manufactured products
(b) Consolidation of quota abolitions: 80 p.c. of
manufactured imports from E.E.C. * $ 857m.
If new import quotas on the remaining 20 p.c. are
established, at least 75 p.c. of the quota has to be
allocated to the E.E.C.
(c) Opening of 84 global import quotas:
Basic value
+ 13 percentage cumulative increase
in six years
Maximum limit of 5 p.c. of total
imports from E.E.C. for global
import quotas
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General List 30 20 10 0 0 0 60
{$ 70m.) or: (30) (20) (10) (io) (0) (0) (70)
Special List 10 0 10 0 10 10 40
(S* 9m.)
For agricultural and fishery products there will be tariff
reductions in the order of 25 to 100 p.c. (in some cases
subject to maximum amount limitations) affecting t 180m.
Average tariff cut by January 1977: 47.8 p.c.
(51.1 p.c.)
Liberalization of Import Quotas
Total abolition for manufactured products (in some cases
there are maximum amount limitations for preferential
treatment)
Tteference year: 1968. - Reference period: 1966-68 (average).
Source: Compiled according to the regulations of the Agreement.- 9 -
supply potential. This is particularly true of agricultural and
fishery commodities, of which only 46.5 percent will enjoy tariff
reductions, in some cases (such as oranges, lemons, wine) subject
to ceiling limitations and in some others (such as tomatoes, grapes)
to time period limitations. But even for a number of manufactured
products, some of which are relatively labour-intensive, the E.E.C.
was interested in not giving too much; for instance, Spain's exports
of cotton and some petroleum products will enjoy only a quantitatively
limited preferential treatment, while her exports of cork manufactures,
of cotton yarn and thread, and of pile and chenille fabrics have been
excluded from the Agreement. This sort of restrictiveness on the
part of the E.E.C. is, of course, not surprising at all; it is per-
fectly consistent both with the Common Agricultural Policy typically
aimed at achieving specific social objectives (Article 39 of the
Treaty of Rome) at the expense of foreign producers (and domestic
consumers) and with the spreading of nationalistic and neo-mercanti-
listic philosophies within the Community which justify the preserva-
tion of actually or potentially "sick" industries at the expense of
the well-being of the general public. One may argue that Spain has
also tried to protect industries, workers and farmers against the
impact of imports from the Common Market. To the extent that this is
true, it will lead to a less efficient domestic economy. The point
here, however, is that there is simply an asymmetry in the impact of
freer trade: assuming equal liberalization policies, it will be much
greater in Spain than in the Common Market, because Spain is a
marginal supplier in the E.E.C. market for most products (particu-
larly the manufactured ones), while the Community's producers,
being far more efficient, might be able to invade the market of the
less advanced Spanish economy and to seriously hurt Spanish
labourers by putting them out of work. Moreover, the different
degrees of development in Spain and the E.E.C. leads one to believe
that both affected firms and workers in the E.E.C. are better able
to adjust to the impact of imports than firms and workers in Spain.- 10 -
9. Notwithstanding the restrictive elements in the PTA, the import
tariff cuts staged over six years could be advantageous for Spain.
On a superficial view, at least, the Agreement represents an improve-
ment compared with the previously existing conditions for her trade
with the Common Market. The average reduction of E.E.C. tariffs is,
from a relatively low level, 47.8 percent; that of Spain's tariffs
is, from a relatively high level, 22.9 percent (Table I). ' Other
things being equal, these tariff cuts are bound to increase the
magnitude of trade flows between both partners. To what extent, is
an empirical question. As the time elapsed since the agreement is
very short, it is too early to quantify the mutual trade expansion
which has resulted from the PTA. Ex ante estimates may be of some
usefulness, but one has to know the price elasticities of demand for
imports and supply of exports in both Spain and the E.E.C, and the
elasticity of substitution between preferred and non-preferred pro-
ducts in both markets. In view of the well-known conceptual problems
involved in the estimation of price elasticities, combined with some
shortcomings in the available data, no elasticities (neither in the
short nor in the long-run) have been measured. In order to obtain
an idea of the possible trade expansion, let us assume infinite
demand and unitary supply elasticities for Spain's exports to the
Community and infinite elasticity of supply and -0.5 elasticity of
demand for the E.E.C.'s exports to Spain. These assumptions imply a
growth of Spain's export of the same magnitude as the tariff reduc-
tions offered by the E.E.C, while the E.E.C. exports to Spain would
increase by roughly 11 percent on average.
10. The trade pattern which is to emerge from the reciprocal tariff con-
cessions is closely related with the allocative effects which the
PTA may bring about.
If the E.E.C. reduces the tariffs on products included in the General
List by 70 percent, Spain will reduce tariffs for List A by 70 and
for List B by 30 percent. As a result, the depth of the tariff cuts
will increase somewhat.- 11 -
(a) The impact on the allocation of resources is properly judged
not from nominal tariffs on products but from tariffs in terms
of the value added at "bich the commodity in question is produced
("effective tariffs"). This is so because the combination of
PTA output and input tariffs determine the extent to which a
domestic producer will have to operate with a value added lower
than what existed before the Agreement. Ideally, one should
therefore try accurately to quantify the new effective rates
of tariff protection and then to estimate the subsequent effects
of effective tariff changes on trade flows. This approach might
be more relevant for Spain than for the E.E.C. As one can reason-
ably assume that the small share of Spain in E.E.C. trade renders
the position of her exporters with respect to E.E.C. producers
more or less analogous to that of perfect competitors, they might
not be able to influence the output and input prices prevailing
in the Common Market; hence the PTA is not likely to reduce the
effective protection accorded to E.E.C. producers through the
2)
Common External Tariff (CET) below what it would otherwise be.
The protection of Spain's producers, however, is likely to change.
The practical and conceptual problems involved in an attempt to
The rate of effective tariff protection is usually defined as
n n
e. «= (t- - £ a..t.) / (l-£ a..)> where t. and t. are the
nominal tariffs on the output and the inputs and the a.. are the
intermediate inputs per unit of output.
2) For a detailed discussion of this point and an illustration with
some exemplary cases see L. Gamir, Las preferencias efectivas del
Mercado Comun a Espana (Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Credito, 1972),
p. 177 et seqs.- 12 -
quantify those changes are, again, so great that one may want
to avoid going too far. For the purpose at hand it was regarded
as sufficient to provide some indication of the reduction in
effective tariffs; this can be accomplished by means of applying
simple rules of thumb. The rough estimates presented in Table 3
are based on the, admittedly somewhat arbitrary, assumption
that the nominal tariffs on final products and on the major
inputs used in their manufacture have been reduced in a like
manner. This means that effective tariffs in Spain will move,
more or less, in step with the nominal tariffs. Taking, for the
sake of simplicity, the average tariff cuts as indicators of the
tariff reductions accorded to all products traded between Spain
and the E.E.C., one can then easily obtain the new rates of
effective tariff protection.
(b) Treating the evidence available with due caution, it points to-
wards the conclusion that despite the PTA a tariff structure
persists on both sides which is escalated according to the stage
of manufacturing undergone by a particular product. It is
evident from the post-PTA effective rates of protection in Spain
as well as in the Community that these rates remain, on average,
highest for consumer goods, lower for intermediate products and
lowest for capital goods. This cascading structure of tariffs
entails a discrimination against domestic-raw-material-based
and/or labour-intensive export products (mainly processed food
This type of tariff structure for the E.E.C. as a whole has been
found by B. Balassa, "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries:
An Evaluation", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 73, December 1965,
pp. 573-594. Although Balassa's estimates refer to 1962 and the
Community has since then reduced its external tariffs, particularly
as a result of the Kennedy Round, it did so in a way which prevented
the cascading phenomenon from disappearing. Some fresh evidence (for
1972) on two Common Market countries - Germany and the United King-
dom -, which was presented recently, corroborates this statement.
See J.B. Donges, G. Fels, A.D. Neu et al., Protektion und Branchen-
struktur der westdeutschen Wirtschaft (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1973),
pp. 16-35. - N. Oulton, "Tariffs, Taxes and Trade in the UK: The
Effective Protection Approach", Government Economic Service Occasional
Papers, No. 6 (1973).Table 3
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and consumer goods) in the manufacture of which Spain may have
a comparative advantage and the E.E.C. as a whole a comparative
disadvantage. It follows that, whatever the real impact of the
PTA on Spain's exports to the Common Market, a good deal more
exports could be achieved if the Agreement had produced more
rational tariff structures. It is a matter of conjecture whether
the PTA reflects the weak position of Spain in the E.E.C. trade
and, consequently, also in the negotiations, or whether the
Spanish Government was not aware of the need to formulate its
bargaining strategy in terms of effective rates of protection.
(c) The likelihood that the effective rates of tariff protection in
the E.E.C. will not be affected by the PTA and the fact that most
of the initial common external tariffs are already relatively
low might seem to be an argument against the significance of the
E.E.C. preferences for Spain's exports. This would be wrong for
at least three reasons. First, the tariff preference enables
Spanish exporters, owing to their assumed price-taker position,
to raise their price (net of CETs) for products they want to sell
in the Common Market up to the level at which the preferential
tariff-inclusive sale price equals the price in the Community.
Second, the margin of preference enjoyed by Spanish exporters
compensates them, partially or totally, for the negative effective
protection imposed by Spain's tariff structure and which they
The margin for price increase related to value added at international
prices reflects the rate of subsidy which is accorded to Spain's ex-
porters. The magnitude of this subsidy appears important, as is
shown by L. Gamir, The Common Market, the U.K. and the Effective
Preferences to Spain (mimeographed, February 1973). The subsidies,
which have been calculated on the basis of 1970 tariffs and value
added for 26 manufacturing branches and assuming a 70 percentage
tariff cut in the E.E.C, varies between 1.5 percent (shipbuilding)
and 42.9 percent (fabrication of cellulose, paper and cardboard), the
unweighted average being 24.2 percent.- 15 -
were facing to the extent that they had to pay tariff-inclusive
prices for material inputs , while they obtained (only) the
Common Market prices on their export sales. In other words: the
subsidy component of Spain's effective tariffs on exportables
into the E.E.C. will become positive, while the tariff preferences
granted by Spain to E.E.C. exporters will reduce the degree of
implicit taxation of value added obtainable in exporting to the
Common Market; in extreme cases, the effective tariff protection
of Spain's exports can become - so far as trade with the Community
is concerned - positive. Third, all this reduces the bias against
exporting inherent in Spain's tariff structure and might encourage
firms to increase their production for export at the expense of
third (non-preference-receiving) countries with whom Spain is
competing.
11. To sum up the picture obtained so far: the PTA could be regarded, at
the time it was concluded, as an important step in the direction of
intensifying the economic relations between Spain and the E.E.C,
as well as of encouraging Spain's exports and promoting the country's
economic development (although it has accomplished less than what
had been intended). Politically, it had the immense value to "force"
the Spanish Government to do what is good for the country from a
social economic point of view (i.e. to liberalize its trade), but
what had been much more difficult to undertake without the Agreement
because of the resistance offered by powerful inward-lookers. Indica-
tive of this is the fact that the trade liberalization process which
so vigorously began in 1959/60 was loosing momentum during the late
1960s.
There is a kind of drawback-scheme in Spain, but it does not
reimburse export firms for tariffs paid (directly or indirectly)
on all inputs used in the production of exportables.- 16 -
12. Now, however, there is the question of whether or not the value
of the PTA to Spain's export sector is likely to be reduced by
both the unilateral Generalized System of Preferences for
developing countries (GSP), implemented by the E.E.C. in July
1971, and the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom to the Community, which became effective in January 1973.
(a) The GSP, despite being subject to a number of shortcomings,
is doubtless far more generous than the PTA, particularly
2) as far as manufactures are concerned. Since industrial
exports of 91 developing countries and 47 so-called dependent
territories are admitted in principle free of customs duties
by the E.E.C. member countries, Spanish exporters, who have
to pay tariffs, are in a disadvantageous position in compari-
son with their competitors in the GSP-receiving countries
(particularly Argentina, Mexico, Hong Kong, Singapore,and
Yugoslavia). This is especially true of consumer goods, which
are still relatively highly protected in the E.E.C.j and it
holds true even if one recognizes that the geographical
proximity of Spain to the Common Market may offset part of
the competitive disadvantage resulting from the GSP. The
discrimination against Spain would become more serious, if
the GSP, which the United States is planning to enact, also
excludes Spain.
It should be noted in addition that the concessions offered
to Spain by the original Six seem to be inferior to those
granted through bilateral agreements to Greece (1962), Morocco
(1970), Tunesia (1970) and Turkey (1964, 1970). By contrast,
the PTA appears superior to the agreements concluded by the
E.E.C. with other countries of the Mediterranean basin, such as
Cyprus (1972), Egypt (1972), Malta (1971), Israel (1970) and
Lebanon (1972).
2)
For a comparative analysis see R. Tamames, Acuerdo preferencial
CEE/Espana y preferencias generalizadas (Barcelona: Dopesa,
1972).
3)
This is quite likely to happen because the U.S. Trade Reform
Act of 1973, according to current plans, provides for the denial
of preferences to those countries which extend preferential
treatment to the export products of another developed country
or group of countries.- 17 -
(b) The enlargement of the E.E.C. is likely to add to the erosion
of the value of the PTA. This is particularly true of agricultural
products.The main cause lies in the fact that tariffs on agri-
cultural imports in the Three, before their accession to the
E.E.C, were considerably lower than the tariffs of the original
Six (weighted average nominal tariffs were 12 and 21 percent,
respectively); besides, the Three previously granted direct
subsidies to aid their agriculture, while the Six have implemented
a system of variable import levies which soaks up any attempt
of third-country suppliers to expand exports by selling at prices
below the internal target price in the E.E.C. The enlargement
of the E.E.C, therefore, implies a substantial increase of pro-
tection in an area which is very important for Spain (more than
50 percent of Spain's agricultural exports go to the United
Kingdom). In addition, the envisaged equalization of the Three's
agricultural prices with those of the original Community is
likely to encourage farmers to expand their output and in turn
to raise the level of self-sufficiency and reduce import needs
to be satisfied by third countries. On the other hand, the high
trade barriers prevailing against agricultural imports from
Spain prevent E.E.C consumers from changing their consumption
habits in favour of items that Spain could offer at lower prices.
As far as manufactured products are concerned, the new situation
does not look as bad. But even here the Three granted in many
cases (particularly in the consumer-goods industry) lower effec-
tive protection to domestic producers than did the original
Community and they will have to change this now in the course of
It is interesting to see in this context that - in 1972 and taking
into account the Kennedy Round effects - the average effective rate
of tariff protection for the manufacturing industry as a whole (ex-
cluding food, beverages and tobacco) was 6.4 percent in the United
Kingdom as compared to 10.1 percent in Germany. The nominal tariffs
were, on average, 3.8 and 7.8 percent, respectively.- 18 -
the progressive introduction of a customs union between the Six
and the new entrants. To the deterioration of the conditions of
market access for Spain's exporters, one has to add trade diver-
sion effects which are likely to result from the fact that the
dismantling of intra-E.E.C. tariffs (as the Three become integra-
ted into the Community) will place producers inside the enlarged
Community (even the less efficient ones) in a better competitive
setting than Spain's suppliers. Finally, it should be mentioned
in passing, that the trade structure between Spain and the Three
differs greatly from that between Spain and the Six. If the
acceding countries adopted the PTA in its original form, they
would therefore reach an even lower coverage than that of the PTA,
especially as far as agricultural products are concerned. It
follows from all the above that while the Three would get easier
access to the Spanish market, Spain's exports have to overcome
new trade barriers. The phasing out of the Commonwealth prefe-
rences can be expected only to partially offset the negative
impact on Spain's exports of the E.E.C. enlargement. On the one
hand, Commonwealth countries have been given the option to apply
either for an association or a preferential trade agreement with
the enlarged E.E.C.; on the other hand, the United Kingdom, as
well as Denmark and Ireland, will adapt their preferential schemes
for developing countries to the Community's GSP.
Although the answers to the questions raised are bound to be
speculative, I am strongly inclined to expect the GSP plus the
widening of the E.E.C. to have a certain diversionary impact on Spain's
export trade. Needless to say, the loss of exports to the
In the meantime, the E.E.C. has recognized the urgent need to
revise the Agreement with Spain. But no concrete solutions to
the problem have so far been found, with the exception of an
enlargement protocol concluded in December 1972, according to
which the original PTA will not be applied to the trade rela-
tions between Spain and the three new members until new negotia-
tions have taken place.- 19 -
preferred developing countries as well as to the enlarged CoiEnuriity
is not likely to occur in the form of a decline in absolute values.
What one has to expect is that Spain's exports to the Common Market
will be less than what they otherwise would have been.
The Challenge to Spain's Industry
13. Notwithstanding the above arguments, the preferential treatment of
trade between Spain and the E.E.C. is certainly of value to both
sides, provided the export supply potential of the beneficiaries
2) . ...
is high. Producers of the Community ought to have no difficulties
in expanding their exports to Spain in response to the tariff re-
ductions. For Spain's manufacturers, however, the integration with
the Common Market represents a greater challenge. Will they be able
to compete effectively with the many highly efficient E.E.C.
industries in the markets of Spain and the Nine? What kind of
policies is the Spanish Government to follow in order to bring
about the indispensable structural improvements and to strengthen
the international competitiveness of the country's industry?
I leave out agriculture in the following remarks because agri-
cultural trade presents a number of special problems which deserve
more attention than can be devoted in the limited space available
for this paper. An interesting analysis of the issues involved
is provided by L. Gamir, Las preferencias efectivas del Mercado
Comun a Espana, op. cit. , Ch. 2.
2)
Of course, it is not only preferential treatment that matters
when assessing the effects of the integration process. The out-
come will depend on a great variety of factors (such as selling
price, quality, terms of payment and of delivery, and marketing)
which determine the degree of competitiveness with respect to
foreign suppliers.- 20 -
14. Judging from Spain's economic performance after 1959, which has
been analyzed elsewhere , one may be inclined to face the
future with reasonable confidence. Reaction of entrepreneurs to
the intensification of foreign competition during the process
of import liberalization proved the ability of many Spanish
firms to improve organizational and technological efficiency in
production rather quickly. And the spectacular increase in Spain's
manufactured exports during the 196O's can be ascribed in not
too small a proportion to an improvement of international com-
petitiveness within Spanish manufacturing industry. It is,
therefore, not unreasonable to expect Spanish industry to be
capable to exploit the opportunities of increasing integration
in the future too. The availability of excess capacity, combined
with the relatively low export-to-output ratio, indicates that
output for exporting into the Common Market may be expanded in
many cases at constant costs; where that is not possible,expor-
ters might still be able to compete by selling their products
marginally priced.
15. However, one can hardly overlook the fact that Spain is still in
the process of becoming an industrialized economy and that, sub-
sequently, she is still beset with a number of basic structural
problems, which might make it difficult for domestic producers
to compete successfully for market shares at home and abroad as
well as to consolidate achieved export positions.
(a) One serious structural weakness is due to the proliferation
of firms and to the small scale of production in many enter-
prises. This is even true of those sectors like the chemical
See the author's articles: "From an Autarchic towards a
Cautiously Outward-Looking Industrialization Policy", op. cit.,
p. 55 et seqs. - "Spain's Industrial Exports: An Analysis of
Demand and Supply Factors, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 108,
No. 2, 1972, p. 198 et seqs. - "Shaping Spain's Export Industry",
World Development, Vol. 1, September 1973, p. 19 et seqs.- 21 -
industry, iron and steel industry and transport equipment, in
which the minimum efficient size requirements are, for technical
reasons, quite high. Of all manufacturing firms in Spain, about
90 percent employ less than 50 persons; the Gini-index of con-
centration in total manufacturing is not higher than 0.5 (the
theoretical upper limit being unity); the value added per employee
in Spain's industry reaches only 40 percent of the Community's
productivity level; a similar gap exists as to the volume of
sales per employee; and Spain has only 65 manufacturing firms
with an annual turnover of more than US-# 25 million, while
the corresponding number in, say, Germany is 390 and in France
360. All this results in cost disadvantages vis-a-vis E.E.C.
manufacturers.
(b) Additional structural problems have shown up in the form of a
lack of specialization among firms, a partial obsolescence of
installed equipment, the use of manual rather than industrial
production techniques in some branches, a fragmentation of
distribution lines, a lack of standardization of products, an
unbalance of quality standards within branches, a lack of inte-
gration of production lines within individual firms, an inadequate
provision with finance (particularly working capita
1-) the pro-
tection of employees against lay-off, an overstaffing and a more-
than-one-occupation attitude of employees in a number of enter-
prises controlled by the public "Instituto Nacional de Industria",
a reluctance among many entrepreneurs to adapt imported technolo-
gies to market size and resource endowments, and a poor perfor-
mance of management in many firms. Under such circumstances the
competitive position of the Spanish industry in the markets cannot
but remain weak.
(c) What are the implications of these structural weaknesses for industrial
prices in Spain? If Spanish manufacturing firms tend to suffer, on
average, from structural backwardness compared with enterprises in
the E.E.C, their costs and prices would be higher than in the- 22 -
Common Market. If one looks around in Spain, one will find
much evidence which lend support to this conclusion. More
formally, this view has been tested by computing ratios
of Spanish to E.E.C. prices for 275 industrial items. The
results are summarized in Table 4. No precise meaning should
be read into these figures which can only indicate, in a rough
manner, the order of magnitude involved. Bearing all qualifica-
tions in mind, it can be seen that in 9 out of 16 branches
Spanish domestic prices are higher than the corresponding
E.E.C. prices; most out of line are paper products, iron and
steel, and non-ferrous metal products. The iron and steel industry
illustrates particularly well the scope of the problem in
question. Although material input prices and labour costs do not
put Spanish steel-makers in an unfavourable position, actual
prices of, for instance, flat products are up to 20 percent
higher in Spain than in the Community. This fact is bound to
inhibit many other industries, for which steel is a major material
input, from being efficient producers (at least as long as Spain's
industrial legislation requires domestic industries to use
Spanish steel even if it could be purchased more cheaply abroad).
16. The Spanish Government is aware that the solution of all these problems,
which largely date back to the pre-1959 period, cannot be left entirely
to the marketplace. What is required, at least temporarily, is the
comprehensive formulation of policies providing the right signals
for reorganizing and modernizing the industrial sector so that
private firms can undertake the appropriate actions themselves. The
policy guidelines of the Third Four-Year-Plan (1972-75) are directed
to that end. A well-conceived structural policy must include, among
other things, the establishment of minimum plant sizes for new in-
vestments, the promotion of mergers among Spanish firms and between
Spanish firms and foreign partners, the concentration of sales
through the creation of producer associations, a relaxation of the
severe restrictions on the dismissal of unneeded workers, and devices- 23 -
















































































Sources: Calculated from Comisaria del Plan de Desarrollp Economico y Social:
Industria basica del hierro y del acero. Madrid 1968. - Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica: Precios al consumidor en los paises del Mercado Comun y en
Espa"na. Madrid 1970. - Data provided by Spanish firms.- 24 -
to carry out quality controls. In addition, the restructuring of
industries, which was started in the First-Four-Year Plan Period
(1964-67) by means of establishing "industrial growth centers" and
"concerted actions" of firms and the Government, is to continue.
And so is the expansion of the infrastructural network on a proper
scale (particularly in the field of education and manpower training).
The Government should not contemplate the possibility of granting
special protection to industries which are, and will remain, unable
to withstand competition from abroad; otherwise substantial ineffi-
ciencies in resource allocation would arise which entail (static and
dynamic) costs for the economy as a whole. It should envisage, on the
other hand, the promotion of export activities so that they are given
the same chances to develop as import substituting industries. Such a
structural policy is likely to impose severe strains on the weaker firms
and workers, while the stronger parts of the industries will gain in
form of higher productivity and real income. Some provisions are then
indispensable to compensate for the losses of all those affected by
the integration process and the concomitant shifts of production; such
assistance would also neutralize resistance against structural readjust-
ment which may not be felt any longer as being an unjust hardship but
2)
as a temporary sacrifice involved in a promising long-term venture.
The Outlook
17. The prospects for intensifying economic relations between Spain and the
E.E.C. in the future appear somewhat ambiguous.
For an evaluation of some of the results obtained so far9 see L. Gamir
et. al., Politica Economica de Espaiia (Madrid: Guadiana de Publica-
ciones, 1972), Ch. 13.
2)
The apparent cost to the Spanish Government of adjustment assistance
could be partly matched by simplifying and rationalizing the present
complex system of industrial incentives, which provides in many cases
excessive benefits to firms, which contains a great deal of overlapping
and which cause the Government a substantial loss of revenue (estimated
in the order of VS-$ 500 million annually).- 25 -
(a) Spain has a vital stake in expanding trade with a highly developed
economic area such as the Common Market, having actually a
population of 253 million and a per-capita income of US-g 2,500
and, subsequently, one of the highest purchasing powers in the
world. On the other hand, Spain can become an increasingly impor-
tant market for E.E.C. exports and direct investments due to the
undisputed high development potentialities of the country.
(b) This means that the Spanish Government should carry on the
process of gradually opening-up the national economy; the political
leaders, as well as public opinion and the individual sectors of
economic life, are, in the majority, ready to continue this
venture. ' Larger balance-of-trade deficits, which are likely
to arise in this context, might not cause foreign-exchange problems
of any kind; they can be offset by earnings stemming from foreign
tourism (which are expected to remain very high), by long-term
capital inflows from the E.E.C. on which the PTA might have a
favourable influence, and by export expansion itself, which might
2) accelerate once Spanish entrepreneurs become more outward-minded.
A case for a stronger economic integration of Spain with Latin America,
instead of the E.E.C, has been made by a few respectable Spanish
economists. See,for instance, R. Tamames, Estructura Economica de
Espaiia, 6th edition (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicacidries, 1971), p* 771
et seqs. Although it has to be recognized that Spain may, find some
marketing advantages in the Latin American countries, I really believe
that from Spain's national point of view there are no either-or-
alternatives between integration with the E.E.C. and integration with
Latin America. Spain can afford to have both and it would probably be
contrary to her interest to neglect the value of an economic approxima-
tion to the Community.
2)
As a matter of fact, an increasing number of Spanish entrepreneurs are
beginning to understand that the key to future industrial growth is the
foreign market. One can already observe that firms are paying more
attention than in the past to studying foreign markets, to partici-
pating in international fairs and to differentiating their products by
trade marks and customers service. For an interesting study on Spain's
export entrepreneurs see J. Viudez, "The Export Behaviour of Spanish
Manufacturers: An Evaluation of Interviews" Kiel Discussion Papers,
No. 25, November 1972.- 26 -
If despite all this a balance-of-payments problem arises there is
always the possibility of exchange-rate adjustment to ensure
equilibrium.
(c) No doubt, the motivation for economic integration with the E.E.C.
will rapidly disappear if the Community's attitude towards Spain
shows no awareness of this country's economic and commercial
interests. The E.E.C. should, therefore, accept more rapidly than
hitherto the pressure of competition from Spain. This pressure
is most unlikely to cause what E.E.C. countries euphemistically
call market disruption. Where individual firms are exposed to
serious dangers, this would be a reliable indication that they have
ceased to be internationally competitive. This is likely to happen
especially with labour-intensive activities due to labour-scarcity
in the Community. The firms concerned must be made to understand
that they should not try to embark upon defensive investment but
respond to changing conditions by retreating from their traditional
locations and shifting, instead, the compromised segments of their
production, as well as their know-how, to the lower-wage country Spain.
If this argument is applied to the other Mediterranean countries,
with which the E.E.C. has concluded a preferential trade agreement,
one may run into a "fallacy of composition": While the impact of
increasing imports from Spain upon the Common Market will be small,
the total impact of imports from all Mediterranean countries can
nevertheless be large. Whether or nor this view is right, is an
empirical question. If it is, it does not weaken our argument but
points to the need for a far-reaching adjustment assistance policy
in the Community v/hich encourages "declining" domestic industries
to transfer their factors of production to activities of greater
comparative advantage. As it is well known, the E.E.C. has already
accepted the rationale of adjustment assistance - when she established
the European Social Fund to help those effected by increased intra-
European industrial competition. Contrary to common belief, I am con-
vinced that in-depth research would reveal even rapidly increasing
imports from Spain and the other Mediterranean countries to do not
significantly aggravate existing problems arising from changes in
demand structure, from technological progress and from competition
by other developed countries.- 27 -
This would be in the interest of the Community itself; the
emigration of workers from Spain (actually about 1.6 million)
would become less urgent and reduce, subsequently, both the environ-
mental costs on the E.E.C. and the activity crrin :.nJ t.V .••:•: -," iblens
in Spain; consumers in the E.E.C. countries would benefit from a
greater supply of less expensive goods; and the reallocation of
resources would have a positive effect on the Community's produc-
tivity growth and, hence, widen the scope for increases in real
income.
18. Some people may doubt that the E.E.C. will really behave in a liberal
spirit. They may question whether the neo-mercantilists among the Nine
will be ready to desist from preserving comparatively inefficient
industries. And whether long-sighted economic arguments can prevail
over the power of political prejudice. Moreover, critics may argue
that the Community has, after the enlargement, an even more diversified
production structure so that the member countries may consider the
gains from more trade with Spain (and other third countries) as too
low to risk political unrest resulting from increasing import competi-
tion. I must admit that I have doubts of this type too, particularly
because Spain does not have a countervailing power at all. But I am
not (yet) so sceptical as to throw up my hands in despair. It should
be reasonable to expect that, sooner or later, politicians in the
Community will learn how to think and act in terms of economic and
social welfare. The one-sided preoccupation of the governments with
the interests of producers is less readily tolerated today, particularly
by the younger generation, than it once was. One can already perceive
incipient signs of an emerging consumer lobby which may be able to
counter protectionism. In addition, there seems to be a growing concern
about accelerating inflation in a number on major industrialized
countries, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. If the
control of inflation is going to obtain, in the medium run, higher
prioroty than the fight against unemployment, the gradual cutting of- 28 -
import trade barriers may be regarded as a means of reducing inflation
to rates, which are socially and politically more acceptable. Neverthe-
less, it may well be the case that all these considerations are a
matter of wishful thinking. Then, the prospects for Spain's economic
integration with the E.E.G., are of course, not as rosy as they could
be. The natural reaction in Spain would be one of disappointment,
frustration and hesitancy about Europeanization, with obvious implications
for the country's economic order and political system.